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This conceptual article explores the evolution of dependency theory and deploys the
theory to understand China´s contemporary presence in Africa as a case study to
provide new insights about the usability of this theory and its fundamental concepts. To
this end, this article provides commentary to dependency theory and develops further
its  theoretical  foundations from the viewpoint of this case example.  In an attempt to
understand and explain the phenomenon of contemporary Sino-African engagement,
we explore dependency theory in order to unpack the complexity inherent in China’s
contemporary presence in Africa and ask whether this ´system-level´ relationship is
likely to end in a similar fashion as espoused by dependency theorists in their analysis
of North-South relationship. This paper concludes that straightforward deployment of
dependency theory does not suffice in the light of contemporary Sino-African
engagement. We opine that China-Africa relationship suggests a case of growing
interdependency. We conclude that beyond the economic partnership, cooperation and
solidarity, China’s presence in Africa presents Africa a challenge to question the status
quo, re-orient their values, and to adopt an inward focus on their developmental needs
and priorities.
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Introduction
Dependency theory emerged in the late 1950’s in response to concerns of the gap
between rich and poor countries and that economic growth in the advanced
industrialised countries did not lead to growth in the poorer countries (Ferraro 2008).
Studies carried out by Raúl Prebisch, the then Director of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America (UNECLA) and his colleagues suggested that economic
activity in the advanced countries does not benefit the poorer countries but often
resulted in serious economic challenges in poorer countries (Ferraro 2008).
Dependency theory thus became an important tool to analyse development and
underdevelopment in the international political economy (Namkoong 1999)
As succinctly put by Brown (1985), “…there is no single coherent body of thought that
can be described as ‘dependency’” theory. Instead various theorists stress the key
notion that some countries are conditioned in their development by their dependence
on other countries (or economies)”. Assessing Brown’s viewpoint 30 years later it  is
reasonable to still think that, despite the rich intellectual ideas, debates and writings
from dependency theorists of different leanings, there is still no single unified theory
of dependency.
Despite the intellectual disagreements among dependency theorists there remains some
basic agreements among them, namely the view that the world is divided into two parts,
the centre-industrialised countries and the periphery/the underdeveloped countries, and
that this structure also exists within a state, while they do not all employ the use of the
term centre/periphery, their approach to the structure of the international system
remains the same (Namkoong 1999). They argue that trade between the centre and
periphery is characterised by unequal exchange, which has resulted in
underdevelopment of the periphery. They agree that underdevelopment in third world
countries can be linked to the expansion of the world capitalist system. In order to shed
more light on the diversity of ideas that constitute dependency theory, a breakdown of
dependency theory seems appropriate. This will be done by separating the theory into
two strands: the Marxist and non-Marxist frameworks.
This paper´s contribution is based on the need to re-think dependency theory from a
very specific point of view – that being China’s presence in Africa. Karl R. Popper
(2005: 38) wrote in The logic of scientific discovery that “theories are nets cast to catch
what we call ‘the world’, to rationalize, to explain and to master it […]”. In an attempt
to understand and explain the phenomenon of contemporary Sino-African engagement,
we try to follow Popper´s footsteps. In this paper, we explore dependency theory in
order to unpack the complexity inherent in China’s presence in Africa. To this end, we
ask: Is this relationship likely to end in a similar fashion as espoused by dependency
theorists in their analysis of North-South relationship or is it one of self-reliance, the
‘unity of thought and purpose’ shared by the third world in charting their development
course as referred to by Haq (1976) in the opening chapter of his book The Poverty
Curtain?
The principal question this paper addresses is whether China’s presence in Africa
fosters a new dependency in other words diversifies dependency within the global south
or furthers Africa’s socio-economic development. In order to do this, a systematic
literature review of dependency theory is carried out and applied to understand China’s
presence in Africa. This paper offers a different perspective to the use of dependency
theory in understanding China’s presence in Africa. This is important because China’s
presence in Africa in aspects of trade, aid and investments will continue to rise and thus
remains of interest to leaders, policy makers and scholars as it will undoubtedly have
effects on Africa’s development trajectory. Some studies have largely analysed China’s
presence as reiterating dependency (Taylor 2014) and as the ‘new face of imperialism’
(Lee 2006), however within the dependency literature, we see a role for China as being
not the new ‘centre’ but a catalyst for a rethink on Africa’s development.
Our paper is organised as follows. First, we focus on dependency theory per se – what
are the origins of the theory and how it has developed? Secondly, we explore the main
criticisms presented against dependency theory. And thirdly, we analyse the theory in
the light of China’s current presence in Africa. We conclude this paper by summarising
our reasoning as well as putting forward an agenda for future research.
Schools of thought on dependency theory
Dependency theory has been under debate since the 1960’s. The main aim of the
scholars has seemed to be to explain the cause and result of the dependent status of the
global south in the international political and economic systems. Scholars such as
Mahbub ul Haq and Raúl Prebisch have approached the question of dependency from
a non-Marxist perspective while the likes of André Gunder Frank, Theotino dos Santos
and Immanuel Wallerstein’s views on dependency reflect a Marxist orientation. For
example, Mahbub ul Haq (1976: 3) expresses his concerns regarding the dependent
status of the south in the opening chapter of his book The Poverty Curtain. He writes,
“A poverty curtain has descended right across the face of our world, dividing it
materially and philosophically into two different worlds, two separate planets, two
unequal humanities, one embarrassingly rich and the other desperately poor.”
In the same vein as other dependency scholars, Haq (1976) identifies the roots of the
inequality between developed and developing countries to be their historical past.
According to him, the era of colonialism exacerbated the disparities between the rich
and the poor countries by placing the rich countries of the North in the centre of the
world and the poor countries of the South at the periphery, supplying raw materials to
the North. He argues that these exploitative links evident in the economic dependence
and intellectual slavery remains despite decolonisation. Within the context of this
paper, this theory can be used to speculate that rampant exploitation would less likely
occur between equal partners than unequal partners. In other words, the exploitation
reported in North-South economic engagement has its foundation in historical
inequality. Haq (1976) in his writings focused on providing a solution for altering the
existing relationship that serves to benefit both the industrial countries and the global
south. He argues that if the present unjust order continues, then a rebellion in the third
world that can lead to damages to the western world’s interests is inevitable. Haq (1976)
further identifies that poverty is a global problem in the sense that it is not only related
to poor nations but also to poor people within these nations, thus it is a problem that
has to be dealt with. To do this he suggests a two-pronged offensive as the only way to
eliminate inequality, where the national governments in developed and developing
countries share this responsibility,  developing countries on their  part  must ensure an
equality of opportunity for developing countries to fully engage in and benefit from the
international system. Also, developing countries on their part should carry out internal
reforms to provide the same for their poor so as to remove domestic structural biases.
In short, Haq sees a shared interest in North-South cooperation as the basis for mutual
cooperation, a point where he differs from the other dependency theorist with Marxist
views.
Haq’s view is similar to that of Prebisch, whose views were outlined in various policy
papers during his time as the secretary general of UNECLA. Prebisch’s argued that the
South’s dependent status is caused by the historical development of centre-periphery
relations.  His views differ from Haq in that while Haq emphasised on the impact of
colonialism, he was more concerned with the impact of western industrialisation on the
position of the poor states.
Prebisch (1968) argued that the rapid industrialisation of the North as well as export
competitiveness created a divide between the global North and South resulting in
declining terms of trade for the South and eventually dependency of the South on the
North.  As  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  dependency,  Prebisch  proposes  third  world
countries accelerate industrialisation by adopting import substitution (O’Brien 1975).
Import substitution as prescribed by Prebisch (1968) would only be effective if the
South have developed the capacity not only to substitute imports but also to add value
to natural resources, which can then be exported in the form of processed goods.
Similarly, the rapid industrialisation of the North, which created unfavorable terms of
trade for the South, was made possible through the abundance of certain capacities
particularly  their  control  of  technology  (Shrum  2001).  Similar  to  Haq,  Prebisch
identifies a shared political and economic interest between the North and the South and
argues that it is not just morally imperative for this inequality to be redressed but that
it is in the North’s self-interest to do so. He maintains that the centre is not immune to
the increasingly obvious economic and social tensions in the periphery and thus should
make deliberate efforts to stimulate development in the right direction in these
countries.
Haq and Prebisch share similar views that set them apart from the Marxist school of
dependency theorists. Bokhari (1989) states three major point of views that sets them
apart from the Marxist school. Firstly, their argument that the existing international
economic system can be reformed to accommodate countries of the global South thus
creates no need for southern countries to create a new system or leave the present
system in order to overcome dependency. Secondly, Haq and Prebisch due to the
perceived shared interest between the North and South, argued that the North ought to
introduce  system  reforms  to  safeguard  its  own  interests.  Thirdly,  their  views  and
solutions were influenced by their backgrounds and professional experience as top
officials at the World Bank and the United Nations agency respectively. They unlike
the Marxist school of thought recognised that the international economic system has
benefits to offer to facilitate the global South’s development needs and that the
developed world should facilitate these needs as it is of interest to them if they do. The
Marxist perspective views the system as based on the excesses of capitalism, which is
controlled by the North (Ferraro 2008). Unlike the non-Marxist theorists they argue that
the system cannot be restructured to accommodate the South as the benefits from the
prevailing system is largely accrued by the North. They consider the notion of the
existence of a shared North-South interest as unrealistic given the inability of the South
to modify the system (Hoogvelt 1984).
One  of  the  most  prominent  writers  in  this  viewpoint  is  André  Gunder  Frank,  a
sociologist whose thesis ‘Development of Underdevelopment’ gained wide attention in
this discourse during the 1960’s. In line with the non-Marxist scholars of dependency
theory, Frank also argued that underdevelopment is a product of historical, economic
and political relationship between the North and the South. He writes; ‘Historical
research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the
historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the
satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries’ (Frank 1966:
28).
He further claims that this relation is an integral part of the world capitalist system.
According to him, the capitalist system has put in place a rigid international division of
labour, which is responsible for the underdevelopment of many areas of the world. This
division, he claimed determined the economic, political, social and cultural values in
the dependent states in line with the interest of the dominant states. This division he
maintains,  will  remain as it  serves the purpose of absorbing surplus capital  from the
dependent states to the benefit of the dominant states. He argues that a similar division
also exists within the underdeveloped states. Frank argues that the most impressive
results  of  development  in  underdeveloped  countries  were  recorded  at  periods  when
their ties to developed countries were the weakest citing countries like Argentina,
Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Chile  during  the  Napoleonic  wars  and  the  two  world  wars  as
examples. Frank in his writings also made a distinction between a state of being
‘undeveloped’ and being ‘underdeveloped’. He argued that developed states were in
the state of undevelopment in the past and were free of the structuralist constraints faced
by the underdeveloped states. Thus, stating that the route to development as adopted by
the developed countries is not viable for underdeveloped states. He proposes that
loosening  of  ties  of  the  South  to  the  North  gives  the  South  a  greater  probability  of
achieving development. According to Frank, independence and not interdependence is
the way to get out of dependence.
A Marxist analysis of dependency theory can also be found in the works of Immanuel
Wallerstein. Wallerstein argued that a ‘modern world system’ called the Capitalist
World Economy emerged from the European feudal system in the 16th century. He is
classified as a ‘world system theorist’ due to his analysis. He argues that this system
had resulted in divisions of the world into three, the ‘core, periphery and semi-
periphery’ regions creating a new international division of labour where the
economically and politically strong states at the core achieved their status at the expense
of the states at the periphery. He attributes this new division of labour to the rise of
capitalism,  which  he  argues  still,  exists  in  the  world  today  and  is  the  source  of
exploitation of the periphery states. Wallerstein argues that dependency can be
overcome only via revolutionary socialism within a unified world system.
Another prominent Marxist analysis of dependency theory is found in the works of
Theotonio dos Santos. His views are quite similar to that of Frank in that he sees
dependency as a ‘conditioning situation’ that causes peripheral countries to be
backward and exploited and this status is caused by the international division of labour
perpetuated  in  the  capitalist  system  which  allows  development  to  occur  in  some
countries while restricting it in others. Dos Santos (1970) distinguishes between three
forms of dependency, which the now underdeveloped nations have gone through
namely, colonial dependency, financial-industry dependency and a new type of
dependency. Dos Santos labelled this new form of dependency as technological-
industrial dependency, he asserts that this has further deepened the structure of
dependency in the third world. In a view similar to Frank, dos Santos (1970: 235)
considers the reformist ideas of Prebisch and Haq as ineffective to destroy ‘these
terrible chains imposed by dependent development’ and proposes a social revolution as
the solution to dependency.
The Marxist view of dependency has some historical validity. However, developments
in Asia suggest the North-South economic engagement can lead to positive outcomes
in terms of economic and social development. The rapid industrialisation of South
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia are some examples of this process.
Critiques of Dependency Theory
As no theoretical approach to the study of social science is without critiques,
dependency theory also attracted some criticisms of its own.
Proponents of free-market economics criticise dependency theory for failing to account
for the endogenous factors involved in a country’s development and attributing blame
entirely on external factors (Namkoong 1999). Tony Smith (1979), one of such
liberalists contends that the main misconception of dependency theory is its insistence
that the key causes of underdevelopment of third world countries are not internal factors
but external i.e. the structure of the international system. He asserts that “dependency
theory represents a historically concrete attempt of Marxism to absorb southern
nationalism into a kind of ideological united front” (Smith 1979: 83). This claim is by
no means uncommon, giving the Marxist persuasions within Dependency theory. While
any interaction between nations have the inherent risk of exploitation, at least in the
beginning, international economic system was not set up for the purpose of exploitation.
To do that is to negate the concept of a ‘system’. Actors in a system must have
symbiotic relationship otherwise the system will collapse and destroy the actors.
Having said that, actors must work hard to determine and correct excesses of the system
by building the capability to detect and correct the excesses.
Indeed, when confronting situations where rapid development has occurred such as in
Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan, the theory encounters some difficulties as it
generally accounts for an impoverished South on a global basis, a development that
would not have been possible to achieve anywhere if the argument was valid (Moles
1999).
Sanjaya Lall (1975) also criticises the theory, arguing that the concept of dependency
is defined ‘in a circular manner’ i.e. less developed countries are poor because they are
dependent. He asserts to the impossibility of defining the concept of dependency and
thus cannot be proved to be ‘causally related to continuance of underdevelopment’ (Lall
1975: 808).
Traditional Marxists have also criticised dependency theory for ‘seeking to become a
Neo-Marxism without Marxism’ (Cueva 1976). The theory is criticised for replacing
class conflict with national and regional contradictions (Namkoong 1999), as succinctly
put by Thomas Angotti; “While the ultra-‘left’ line (in the dependency school) fails to
consider the contradiction between nations as a part of the international class struggle,
the rightist line reduce the class struggle to nothing more than a struggle between
nations.” (Angotti 1981: 90)
Also,  Marxists  criticised  the  view  held  by  Non-Marxist  dependency  theorists  that
international trade (unequal exchange) is the key cause in the rise of dependency and
underdevelopment, they argue that while it may help to extend underdevelopment it
does not create it, that capitalism creates underdevelopment (Weaver and Berger 1973).
In spite of criticisms of dependency theory, it is impossible to deny that dependency
theory gave a new perspective on the realities of international political economy and
put the underdevelopment status of the global South on the radar. Ideas emanating from
dependency scholars have been the source of motivation for a focus on development
needs of the global South. Their arguments stressed that the under developed South will
remain in their underprivileged state unless drastic measures are taken to provide an
equality of participation in a system which was designed to benefit the North. It is this
idea that fueled the creation of the Group of 77, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) and demands for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO) (Bohkari 1989). Also, the Non-Marxist ideas have been instrumental in
defining ways that the countries of the global South can develop while remaining within
the current international system. They have stressed the existence of common interest
between the North and the South in terms of mutually beneficial industrial production,
expansion of trade, supply of raw materials, and technological transfer. They have
identified that there is a need to attend to those common issues, areas where the North
cannot maintain absolute independence, an important point that holds true in present
day economy.
Dependency theory has been most influential in discrediting some western ideas about
development in the third world particularly policies and ideas that failed to appreciate
the  specific  developmental  needs  of  the  third  world.  This  has  shaped  discussions  in
development studies today, raising an awareness of the need to examine the patterns of
economic development specific to third world countries and strategies that recognise
the specific needs of these countries (Bohkari 1989). This discussion can be linked to
the popularity of South-South cooperation, which criticises those misplaced western
ideas regarding development in the global South and the conditionalities placed on
countries of the South by the West, conditionalities that do not necessarily meet the
development needs of these countries (Amanor 2013). The idea that developing nations
of the South might find more appropriate and sustainable solutions to development by
collaborating with other developing countries of the South underlies South-South
cooperation (Fordelone 2009, Rosseel et al. 2009).
An increasingly cited example of South-South cooperation is Chinese engagement in
Africa. Following China’s unprecedented growth is its increasing presence in Africa
evident in its engagement in the continent on levels on trade, investment and aid. As
China-Africa relations continue to evolve, there continues to be a debate on just what
China’s presence in Africa means for Africa’s development. Is China a development
partner or Africa’s new coloniser?
The next section addresses China’s presence in Africa and we shall attempt to
understand this phenomenon using dependency theory.
Case – China’s Contemporary Presence in Africa
Background
The growing relations between China and Africa have been accompanied with intense
scrutiny. There has been a lot of interest from academia, the media, development
agencies and western governments, negative and positives views have been expressed,
conjectures and accusations have also been made of China’s ongoing presence in Africa
being an attempt to ‘neo-colonise’ Africa. Former British foreign secretary, Jack Straw
stated that “most of what China has been doing in Africa today, is what we did in Africa
150 years ago” (as cited in Stevenson 2006). Making similar insinuations about China’s
presence in Africa, then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in an interview stated
“We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa”. Similarly, academics have raised
concerns over China’s motives and presence in Africa (Taylor 2006). Given the
sentiments surrounding China’s presence in Africa, we shall attempt to critically view
this phenomenon using dependency theory. Firstly, a background of China-Africa
relations both historical and at present will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs,
followed by an analysis of the phenomenon from the dependency theory point of view.
China in Africa: retrospective view
Chinese engagement with Africa is not a new phenomenon. Discourse on contemporary
China-Africa relations often invokes history as a common reference point (Large 2008),
thus we shall begin with an overview of the historical links between China and Africa.
Chinese contacts with Africa are believed to date as far back as 140–87 BC during the
Han dynasty (Gao 1984). Contacts between China and the African continent predating
1949 were as a result of transnational trade flow with other merchants such as the Arabs
and Persians (Alden and Alves 2008)
The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 saw China as having no
negative record of dealings on the African continent but in fact, it shared a common
past with Africa as it too suffered hardship under western imperialism; a point that
Beijing is often apt to point out (Alden and Alves 2008, Cooke 2009). China saw the
newly independent African states as natural allies and its ‘Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence’ appeared appealing to these new states (Alden and Alves 2008). Thus,
China renewed interests and established official contacts with these states following the
Bandung Conference of 1955 (Renard 2011). According to Alden and Alves (2008),
the  Bandung  conference  which  was  aimed  at  promoting  Afro-Asian  economic  and
cultural cooperation and opposing colonialism was a unique platform for China to
present  itself  to  African  and  Asian  states  as  a  model  of  self-reliance,  as  well  as  a
supporter of Asian-African unity and the independence movements around Asia and
Africa.  China’s  relations  with  Africa  during  the  period  of  the  cold  war,  which  also
marked the post-colonial period for Africa was one that was based on ideology (Zhang
2013). Mao’s ‘Three Worlds Theory’ positioned China as a third world nation along
with other Asian, African and Latin American countries that chose not to align with
neither  the  United  States  nor  Russia  (Alden  and  Alves  2008).  Africa  was  seen  by
Beijing as the ground for ideological competition with the United States, the Soviet
Union and other European influences, as well as a place to export its brand of socialist
revolution to (Alden and Alves 2008, Renard 2011). In this period, China signed an
economic and technical cooperation agreement with Guinea in 1960, granted Ghana an
interest-free loan of US$20 Million, established diplomatic relations with Mali upon its
independence, and trade relations the following year (Renard 2011). China also gave
diplomatic and military support in Southern Africa particularly to liberation movements
ideologically aligned with Maoist China and not the Soviet Union (Alden and Alves
2008).
In North Africa, relations were also established with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.
Sino-African relations were maintained in the early 1960’s, however by 1966 China’s
relations with some African states had turned sour, as China was increasingly viewed
with suspicion that it was seen trying to export revolution into some of the countries
resulting in Chinese diplomats being expelled from some African countries and
diplomatic ties severed by other countries (Alden and Alves 2008), also the cultural
revolution in China contributed to the decline in Sino-African relations in that era.
However, relations did improve in the late 1970’s with Beijing normalising diplomatic
relations with all African countries irrespective of their ideological differences and
increasing its overseas development assistance. African countries welcomed financial
aid and technical assistance from China, they were seen as offering more advantages
than those of traditional western donors (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). As adeptly put by
Alden and Alves (2008: 20), “The West’s employment of conditionalities, merely the
latest in the decades of humiliating experiences at the hands of former colonial powers
and the United States, echoes the humiliations of the ‘unequal treaties’ foisted on China
by the West in the nineteenth century. Indeed, China’s ability to recognise this is part
of the genius of its foreign policy endeavours toward Africa”. Notably, China’s
development aid to Africa during this period was concentrated in fewer countries and
on highly visible projects such as the Tazara railway –a railway line linking Tanzania
to Zambia– a project which several western powers declined to fund (Renard 2011).
China’s commitment to providing development assistance and technical support to
African countries was seen as quite remarkable as China itself  at  the time was quite
poor compared to some African countries (Renard 2011). This renewed relationship
contributed  to  China  gaining  admission  into  the  UN  with  votes  from  26  African
countries. The introduction of economic reforms in China by Deng Xiaoping during the
post-Mao era  led  to  a  shift  in  Sino-African  relations,  while  the  official  principles  of
engagement remained the same, relations were no longer based on ideological interest
but on commercial interest (Larkin 1971, Schiere 2011).
China in Africa: today
The new era of Sino-African relations ushered in relations devoid of ideological
interests  of  the  past  but  a  focus  on  practical  results,  mutual  benefits  and  common
development driven by China’s developmental objectives and its increasing energy
demand (Schiere 2011).
China’s need to secure energy resources to sustain its economic development and its
international push for new markets and resources has in part necessitated the
commercial focus to its ongoing presence in Africa (Konings 2007). Chinese economic
activity on the continent involves both state and non-state actors, the Chinese Ministries
of Foreign Affairs and Commerce have been critical in establishing and maintaining
bilateral relationships with African governments, several state-owned banks of China
have supported China’s presence in Africa. EXIM Bank (China Export-Import Bank)
established in 1994 promotes Chinese FDI (foreign direct investment) and exports
especially in the infrastructure sector (Wang 2007). China Development Bank (CDB)
also founded in 1994, launched the China-Africa Development Fund in 2006 at the
Beijing Summit of FOCAC (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation) to support Chinese
FDI in Africa (SCIO 2013), SINOSURE (China Export and Credit Insurance
Corporation) has provided insurance against risks involved in Chinese exports and
foreign investment since 2001 (Renard 2011). The non-state actors representing
China’s presence in Africa include multinationals, small and medium sized enterprises,
traders who are generally seeking economic opportunities (Osei and Mabiru 2010,
Renard 2011) and their activities cuts across different sectors of the African economy.
China has become Africa’s largest trading partner (Chen et al. 2015), bi-lateral trade
between China and Africa rose steadily between 2000 and 2014. According to Eom et
al. (2016), the volumes of China-Africa trade grew at a rate of over 40% between 2004
and 2009, and has since 2009, slowed to an average of 10% per year. In 2015, China’s
trade with Africa reached approximately US$172 billion in 2015 (CARI 2016a), with
its  top  five  African  trade  partners  being  South  Africa,  Angola,  Nigeria,  Egypt  and
Algeria. Crude oil dominates China’s imports from Africa, the continent being China’s
second largest source of crude oil after the middle-east in 2013, its top suppliers include
Angola, Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria (Alessi and Xu
2015). Other commodities such as iron ores, and copper also feature in China’s imports
from Africa (Eom et al. 2016).
Chinese investment in Africa while trailing behind China-Africa trade volumes remains
modest (Eom et al. 2016). Data compiled by the China-Africa Research Initiative
(CARI) at Johns Hopkins University shows Chinese FDI stock in Africa came to a total
of US$32.35billion in 2014 showing an increase from the 2013 volume which was
US$26 billion USD (CARI 2016b). While Chinese investments in Africa is growing,
China remains a small player compared to other western countries (Chen et al. 2015),
a report from UNCTAD shows that the flow of Chinese FDI into Africa during 2013–
2014 amounts to about 4.4% of the total FDI to Africa. China invests in 49 African
countries (Chen et al. 2015), its top five destinations in 2014 were South Africa,
Algeria, Nigeria, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (CARI 2016b).
These investments also cut across a wide range of sectors, according to China’s
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Chinese investments as of 2011 was largely in the
sectors of mining (31%), banking and finance (20%), construction (16%) and
manufacturing (15%) (SCIO 2013). Chinese investments in sectors such as
manufacturing and construction is notable, according to Brautigam (2016) as at the end
of 2014, MOFCOM approved a number of manufacturing projects in countries like
Nigeria (128), Ethiopia (80), South Africa (77), Tanzania (48) and Ghana (44).
Likewise, China has signed infrastructure-financing agreements with over 35 African
countries, the largest recipients being Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia (Renard
2011). Investments in these sectors (manufacturing and construction) are particularly
significant and have important implications for Africa. As apart from helping to combat
Africa’s deficient infrastructure, investments in these sectors could potentially generate
human capital development gains through employment and opportunities for skills and
technology transfer for local populace and firms. In terms of actors, Chinese state
owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate strategic extractive sectors of oil, ores and
infrastructures and are usually subsidised with grants from Chinese state owned banks.
Chinese medium to large sized enterprises are mainly found in the manufacture of
goods, business services, wholesale trade, telecommunications sectors while the small
sized enterprises are found in the retail and light industry sectors (Renard 2011).
China’s development assistance to Africa is increasing. China is fast becoming an
important aid partner in the continent. Be that as it may, China’s aid is still very low in
comparison to the traditional western aid donors (Brautigam 2011). China has had an
African aid program since the mid 1950’s, with its official development assistance to
Africa provided through grants, concessional (fixed-rate, low-interest) loans, zero
interest loans. (Zafar 2007, Brautigam 2011). At the 3rd summit  of  FOCAC,  China
promised to double its size of aid to Africa. China’s aid to Africa appears to be focused
on industrial and agricultural productivity, funds are mostly directed towards funding
infrastructural development, agriculture, industry, public facilities and provided on a
non-interference policy basis which means there are no preconditions on the receiving
countries to implement certain democratisation policies or advanced human rights
policies, etc. (SCIO 2013). While that of other traditional aid partners such as the USA
is often conditional and directed towards programs that support public health,
democratisation efforts, counterterrorism cooperation, improvement of regulatory
institutions and governance (Zafar 2007). According to data compiled by CARI
(2016c), the Chinese government offered loans worth US$86.3 billion to African
governments and State owned enterprises between 2000–2014, with Angola being the
largest recipient followed by Ethiopia (US$12.3 billion), Sudan (US$5.6 billion),
Kenya (US$5.2 billion) and the DRC (US$4.9 billion). A sizable portion of these loans
financed much-needed infrastructural projects in Africa such as the Addis Ababa–
Adama expressway of  Ethiopia  and  the  Kribi  deep-water  port  of  Cameroon,  and  re-
building war-torn infrastructure in Angola. From 2010 to 2012, China granted 18,743
government scholarships to students from several African countries including South
Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Cameroon, etc. Other projects include the
building of schools, agricultural technology demonstration centres in (Liberia, Rwanda,
Tanzania, etc.) hospitals and anti-malarial centres across several locations in Africa
(Angola, Zimbabwe, etc.) (SCIO 2013).
The strong demand for oil and other mineral resources outside of Africa, particularly
demand from China positively impacted the growth rate of certain African economies
creating conditions for better terms of trade and a higher volume in exports (Besada et
al. 2011, Chen et al. 2015). Similarly, Chinese investments contributed to the
continent’s growth rate (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). According to Chen et al. (2015),
Chinese engagement in Africa has in part impacted Africa’s growth rate positively, the
average African economy realised a surge in per capita growth rate from 0.6% per
annum in the 1990’s to 2% in the 2000’s.
As China undergoes a slow-down in economic growth as it rebalances its economy, it
is expected that the volume of China-Africa trade and investments will also decline
(Calabrese 2016). In 2015, China-Africa trade witnessed a slowdown in value from
US$222 billion in the previous year to US$172 billion, the recent drop in commodity
prices has also affected the value of Africa’s exports all around with commodity
exporters being hardest hit. However, Lin (2016) posits that opportunities still abound
for Africa in sectors such as manufacturing particularly as China restructures its
economy away from manufacturing, Africa could potentially capture some of the
manufacturing jobs that will be relocated as labour and production costs rises in China.
According to Calabrese (2016), projects like “One Belt, One Road initiative” could
potentially boost African economies particularly those of Kenya, Djibouti and Egypt as
the inclusion of their ports in the silk maritime route will lead to more investments in
infrastructure and an increase in regional trade. Commitments made at the 6th FOCAC
summit suggest continued economic partnerships between China and African countries.
As the relationship between China and Africa deepens, so does the scholarly interest
on the relationship across different fields of study. The subsequent paragraph discusses
China’s presence in Africa through the lens of dependency theory.
Discussion: The case of China in Africa vis-á-vis dependency theory
Should China’s presence in Africa then be viewed as detrimental to Africa’s
development, an attempt at neocolonialism or a ‘diversification of dependency’?
We argue that a critical point, which dependency theorists pointed out as being the root
of inequality between the North and the South, was their historical past, specifically
colonialism and imperial linkages that persisted after decolonisation. Examining Sino-
African relations under this assumption points out very important points of departure
between China’s relations with Africa and North-South relations. Firstly, China does
not have an imperial heritage in Africa as colonialism under the West, rather it shares
a common past with Africa as it too underwent hardship under western imperialism, a
fact which as mentioned before, China is apt to point out in its diplomacy with Africa
(Alden and Alves, 2008, Cooke 2009). Secondly, China’s relation with Africa saw
China stand in solidarity with African countries in its national independence
movements, forging a new and thriving relationship with the continent (Renard 2011).
Historical relations between China and Africa echoes Beijing’s anti-imperialist and
anti-colonialist stance, its support for newly independent states in Africa is often
invoked to corroborate and assure Africa and the rest of the world that China is not out
to  control  its  economic  and  political  systems  (Mohan  and  Power  2008).  Within  the
engagement between China and Africa is China’s continued stress on South-South co-
operation based on perceived ‘similarities’ between China and African countries.
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his tour of Africa in 1964 referred to China’s
support for Africa’s struggles against imperialism as the ‘poor helping the poor’, while
China’s interactions in Africa during the cold war era was often linked to it ideological
battle with the United States and the USSR. However, China’s ongoing engagement in
Africa is devoid of this ideological undertone, while largely commercial, it stresses a
willingness to partner with Africa towards achieving their common development and
to foster a cooperation that results in helping and supporting each other on the world
stage.
China-Africa engagement can be seen as a practical example of South-South
cooperation (SSC). China is often seen as a more viable development partner for Africa
based on the similarities of socio-economic condition and development issues in China
and Africa, offering an access to appropriate technologies and solutions (UNOSSC
2015). China has carried out several SSC projects in Africa in cooperation with UNIDO
(United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and UNDP (United Nations
Development Programme), namely the ‘lighting up Rural Africa’ project, a project
aimed at providing electricity in rural communities in Africa, under the project, 14
small hydropower projects have been carried out in Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, as
well  as  the  Shiwang’andu  hydro  power  plant  in  Zambia.  Other  projects  include
agricultural projects, and technical exchanges and cooperation (UNOSSC 2015).
Considering the scale and nature of trade, investments and aid, China’s presence in
Africa plays an important role in increasing developmental opportunities in Africa
(Ayodele and Sotola 2014). While China has intensified competition in the
manufacturing sectors in some African countries and its rising demand for oil and other
raw materials raises the risks of further subjecting the continent to a role of supplier of
raw materials and making some countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, etc. more
vulnerable to volatile commodity price fluctuation (Ademola et al. 2009). African
countries still stand to benefit from commodity revenues, and could potentially use their
commodities sectors to spur industrialisation (Mohan 2016). Findings from research
carried out by Morris et al. (2012) in their ‘Making the Most of Commodities Program’
(MMCP) suggests that by creating meaningful backward and forward linkages in their
resource sectors, countries could actually foster wider industrial development as has
been shown in the case of Nigeria (oil sector), Angola (oil sector), Botswana
(diamonds) and Gabon (timber) where local content policies have been used to promote
job creation, skills and technology transfer and value added production (Morris et al.
2012). Furthermore, China’s exports into Africa actually cater to low-income populace
in these countries and leads to reduction in prices of consumer goods in Africa
something African low-income masses need (Ajakaiye et al. 2009, Renard 2011).
There have been a lot of criticisms on the volume of trade imbalances in Sino-African
trade and this has often been compared to the great imbalances under North-South
engagement and echoes the concerns of dependency theorists. China maintains a trade
surplus with Africa, however, there have been attempts from the Chinese government
to address this, by gradually increasing its imports from Africa, also by granting ‘zero
customs duty’ status to imports from some African countries (Danchie 2010).
According to a UNOSSC (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation) 2015
report on China’s South-South cooperation, China removed customs duty to products
coming from least developed African countries, products that make up to 93% of the
countries’ exports to China. In addition to that, China through its establishments of
special economic zones (SEZs) in selected African countries supports export
diversification. China could potentially be a catalyst for the promotion of industrial
activity in some selected African countries where Chinese funded special economic
zones have been established. Not only will this have an impact on the exports of African
countries to China, it has the potential to further attract investments in much needed
sectors, promote manufacturing, and diversify the economy from being majorly
extractive (Brautigam and Tang 2011). According to Sandrey and Edinger (2011), these
zones could potentially contribute to the backward and forward linkages in the host
economies, also create massive employment opportunities and generate greater foreign
exchange reserves through more diversified sources of income. While not all the zones
have begun operations, some have and have been moderately successful, an example is
the Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone, one of the Chinese SEZs in Nigeria. The zone
has had considerable impact on the economy of the local area in Ogun state, Nigeria,
contributing to employment generation (currently employs about 4,500 local workers),
considerable skills and technology transfer, and increased economic activity in the local
area (Caruso et al. 2016).
Dependency theorists highlighted the highly exploitative relations in North-South
relations and how the third world has been condemned to the role of supplier of raw
materials blocking the chances for industrialisation. Given this, the range of relations
within  Sino-African  relations  suggests  that  Africa  is  not  relegated  to  being  just  a
supplier of primary commodities. While China possesses the main industrial productive
capacity in this engagement, there are opportunities for Africa to also engage in
productive activities within the engagement. As mentioned previously, as of the end of
2014, MOFCOM had approved a significant total number of 377 manufacturing
projects in these five countries Nigeria (128), Ethiopia (80), South Africa (77),
Tanzania (48) and Ghana (44) (Brautigam 2016). These projects would contribute to
the industrial capacity of these countries. Other examples of Chinese investments
contributing to industrialisation in Africa include the case of the Huajian group, who
set up a shoe manufacturing factory in Ethiopia in 2011 and has plans of setting up an
industrial park. As at the end of 2013, the Huajian shoe factory had created 4000 jobs
for locals and had begun manufacturing shoes in Ethiopia for export to the global
market (Lin 2016). Another example is the Yuemei Group in Nigeria, which
successfully set up a textile industry park in Nigeria in 2008 (Pigato and Tang 2015).
Furthermore, in Rwanda, Chinese investors set up a garment manufacturing factory,
C&H garments in 2015, and has so far employed about 500 workers, trained them and
is currently exporting from Rwanda to foreign markets (Lin 2016). The aforementioned
manufacturing investments would further increase Africa’s capacity to produce and
trade value added products and could provide opportunities for balancing China-Africa
trade. Not only are such Chinese investments creating employment and training
opportunities for locals but could also facilitate industrialisation in host countries in
Africa. African governments can leverage Chinese investments for socio-economic
development in their respective countries by using concrete industrial and localisation
policies and strategy followed through with effective implementation. A few African
governments have had a measure of success in exerting agency to direct Chinese
investments to crucial sectors of their economy, as seen in the case of Ethiopia with the
shoe  factory  and  in  the  case  of  Rwanda  with  the  garment  factory.  Officially,  within
FOCAC, there is a focus on cooperation to foster industrialisation in Africa, the Chinese
President Xi in his speech at the FOCAC 2015 summit, announced a new ‘China-Africa
Industrialization Program’, a program targeted at enhancing Africa’s industrial capacity
that signifies China’s support for Africa’s industrialisation and includes a pledge of
US$10 billion to set up a new China-Africa industrial cooperation fund. As part of the
commitments laid out in FOCAC 2015, China plans to set up industrial parks, regional
vocational education centres and capacity building schools. These commitments also
include plans to train 200,000 technical personnel and provide training opportunities
for 40,000 African personnel in China (Eom et al. 2016). While it will take a while for
these commitments to be implemented, these plans suggest China’s continued
commitment to partner with African countries in fostering development.
Chinese investments in Africa open up opportunities for employment and training
contributing to skill building, technology transfer and human capital development.
Though there have been criticisms of Chinese investments in Africa, particularly on the
potential of these investments to create jobs, to add value to industries in Africa
(Ancharaz 2013), and the labour practices of Chinese companies (Baah and Jauch 2009,
Flynn 2013). These criticisms have often not been based on concrete data (Oya and
McKinley 2016). Research carried out by Sautman and Yan (2015) on over 400 Chinese
enterprises and projects in 40 plus African countries found that over 85% of their
workforce are local African workers, while there is some variation in countries, cases
of lower than average localisation rate was mainly in Angola and Algeria due to years
of civil war which has led to de-skilling of the populace and migration of skilled
workers to Europe respectively. Chen et al. (2016) in their study of Chinese
manufacturing firms in Nigeria and their potential for skills and technology transfer,
found that firms sampled employ 80% of their workforce locally, and engage in
workforce training. Their findings also showed cases of positive technology transfer
and linkages to local suppliers in the firms surveyed. Their research concludes that not
only can Chinese FDI in manufacturing generate local employment but can contribute
to industrialisation by providing opportunities for skills and technology transfer,
promoting linkages with domestic firms which could integrate local firms in global
manufacturing supply chains and increasing opportunities for developing countries to
upgrade their domestic production.
We argue that focusing rather narrowly on the misconceptions surrounding China’s
economic activities in Africa often leads to a short-sighted analysis of the relations
between Beijing and the continent. China has chosen to engage Africa in a distinctive
manner  evident  in  the  FOCAC.  Using  the  platform  of  FOCAC,  China  seeks  to
differentiate itself from the ‘prescriptive, intrusive and hierarchical (donor and
recipient)’ approach of western actors by emphasising that its engagement with Africa
is one of mutual benefit, win-win engagement that promotes common development
(Alden and Large 2011) espousing a spirit of partnership (Zhang 2013). Dependency
theorists challenged both western and soviet models of development and ceased to
recognise these models as ideal for development in the third world. They reject the
notion that all nations can attain development by following prescribed stages and
prerequisites to growth that have been prescribed by the industrialised world. China is
seen to promote what is referred to as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ in Africa (Besada et al.
2011), a ‘model’ that seeks to replace the widely-criticised and largely disappointing
Washington Consensus, a prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to economic
growth and development (Ramo 2004). This western approach espoused by western
agencies often accompanied its financial assistance with conditionalities, which have
not always suited the developmental needs of the recipient country and have in fact
been detrimental to some developing economies (Stiglitz 2002, Rodrik 2006). African
leaders and masses often see the western approach accompanied by their conditions,
which are often centered on economic liberalisation, democratisation, human rights, as
condescending and hypocritical (Cooke 2009). Thus, making China’s ‘respect for
sovereignty’ and policy of non-interference, which has often been questioned, one that
appeals to many African leaders and masses (Cooke 2009).
Thus, China’s approach is one that has offered and offers Africa an alternative in its
choice  of  development  partners  and  model  (He  2013).  China’s  rise  in  the  world
economy is thus seen as an example for Africa, China is seen as opening up new
prospects for Africa’s development (Ayodele and Sotola 2014). Africans often view
China’s engagement in their countries as being pragmatic with quick implementation
and deliverables and in line with their priorities for the continent (Cooke 2009). More
so, within China’s engagement in Africa, there is ‘room for negotiation’ (Mohan and
Lampert 2012) which is further supported under the FOCAC platform, something that
was mostly lacking in North-South relations due to great power imbalance between the
nations involved (Girvan 2007) a point echoed in the dependency literature. China’s
presence in Africa is not one that is totally lacking in African agency, according to
Mohan and Lampert (2012: 109) “African actors have been able to shape these
relationships in ways that advance their own interests and aspirations and or produce
forms of wider social benefit”, this signifies that China’s presence in Africa gives the
leeway and is being steered (Mohan and Lampert 2012) to be beneficial to Africa’s
development.
Conclusions
China’s presence in Africa is an opportunity for Africa to practice self-reliance that
translates not into the utopian ideal of Autarky but controlled engagement beneficial to
the socio-economic developmental needs of Africa. We argue that what China’s
presence means for Africa beyond economic partnership, cooperation and solidarity is
a challenge to question the status quo, re-orient their values and adopt an inward focus
on their developmental needs and priorities, letting that dictate their economic
engagements with other countries after all China can be said to have towed the same
road towards development. While the ideology, official discourse and framework
guiding China-Africa relations hold the promise of a win-win relationship and indeed
China  has  a  lot  to  contribute  towards  Africa’s  development,  we  stress  that,  like  any
engagement between two or more actors there are risks and opportunities. As China-
Africa relations continue to evolve, it is clear that in order for Africa to maximise the
opportunities and minimise the risks in its relationship with China, African leaders need
to assert more agency and ownership and approach the relationship with clearly
articulated interests, policies and strategies that promote the welfare of their citizens
and facilitate development in crucial sectors of their economy. It is also in China’s
interest to remain a responsible partner particularly in relation to regulating Chinese
enterprises in Africa, promoting a more balanced China-Africa trade and addressing
financial burdens that could arise due to China’s loans to African countries. From the
dependency point of view, we opine that China-Africa relationship suggests a case of
growing interdependency. A new direction for future research should be from a
viewpoint of increasing interdependency between systems and its implications for
development.
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